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Abstract—We study the influence of degree correlations or
network mixing in interdependent security. We model the inter-
dependence in security among agents using a dependence graph
and employ a population game model to capture the interaction
among many agents when they are strategic and have various
security measures they can choose to defend themselves. The
overall network security is measured by what we call the average
risk exposure (ARE) from neighbors, which is proportional to the
total (expected) number of attacks in the network.
We first show that there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium of a population game. Then, we prove that as the
agents with larger degrees in the dependence graph see higher
risks than those with smaller degrees, the overall network security
deteriorates in that the ARE experienced by agents increases and
there are more attacks in the network. Finally, using this finding,
we demonstrate that the effects of network mixing on ARE
depend on the (cost) effectiveness of security measures available
to agents; if the security measures are not effective, increasing
assortativity of dependence graph results in higher ARE. On
the other hand, if the security measures are effective at fending
off the damages and losses from attacks, increasing assortativity
reduces the ARE experienced by agents.
Index Terms—Assortativity, degree correlations, interdepen-
dent security, population game.
I. INTRODUCTION
As many critical engineering systems, such as power grids,
become more connected, there is a growing interest in un-
derstanding the security of large, complex networks in which
security of many comprising agents or subsystems is in-
terdependent. This is dubbed interdependent security (IDS)
by Kunreuther and Heal [17]. It arises naturally in many
settings, and examples include cybersecurity [7], [14], [25],
[26], cyber-physical systems security (e.g., power grids) [8],
epidemiology [30], [34], financial networks and systems [4],
[9], [10], homeland security [13], [18], and supply chain and
transportation system security (e.g., airline security) [12], [16].
The sizes and complexity of these systems as well as
the number of participating agents introduce several major
challenges to studying their reliability and security. This
is especially the case when they contain many individuals,
organizations or (sub)systems that can make local security
decisions based on locally observable risks. Throughout the
manuscript, we refer to these individuals, organizations or
systems that make own security decisions simply as agents.
First, in many cases, it is reasonable to assume that the
agents are rational or strategic and are only interested in their
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own objectives with little or no regards for others. Therefore,
a study of static settings in which the agents make decisions
without taking into account the experienced risks may not
be realistic. Second, in IDS settings, the security of indi-
vidual agents is interdependent, thereby causing the agents’
security decisions to be coupled as a result of externalities
produced by security measures they employ. Furthermore,
these externalities and the resulting security risks seen by
agents depend on the properties of their dependence structure.
Third, any attempt to model and study detailed interactions
between many strategic agents suffers from the curse of
dimensionality. Finally, while there are some popular metrics
used in the literature (e.g., global cascade probability), there
is a lack of standard metrics on which security experts agree
for measuring network- or system-level security.
As mentioned above, the security of the systems in IDS
settings depends on many system properties, including the
properties of interdependence in security among agents, which
we model using a dependence graph. Although the effects of
some graph properties (e.g., degree distributions and cluster-
ing [11], [19], [20]) have been recently studied in the literature,
to the best of our knowledge, the influence of the degree
correlations in the dependence graph with strategic agents
has not been examined before. The degree correlations, which
are also known as assortative mixing, (degree) assortativity or
network mixing, refer to the correlations in the degrees of end
nodes of edges present in the graph.
It has been shown [28], [29] that engineered networks, e.g.,
the Internet, tend to be disassortative, whereas social networks
are typically assortative. In other words, nodes in engineered
systems tend to be connected to other nodes with dissimilar
degrees, while those in social networks exhibit a tendency to
be neighbors with other nodes with similar degrees. These
correlations in the degrees of end nodes in the dependence
graph change the security risk experienced by agents from
their neighbors based on their own degrees. This is because the
security investments chosen by agents with different degrees
are likely to vary and some agents are more vulnerable to
attacks than others. The goal of our study is to shed some
light on how the degree correlations in the dependence graph
affect the security investments of strategic agents and, in doing
so, the overall system security.
While there have been some numerical studies on the
influence of network mixing on the robustness of networks in
static settings (e.g., [28], [29]), as we will discuss in Section II,
there are two key differences between our study and existing
studies: (i) In our study, agents are strategic and can choose
how much they wish to invest in security in response to
the security risks they experience. (ii) The security measures
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2adopted by an agent (e.g., incoming traffic monitoring, anti-
malware utility) produce positive externalities [37] and alter
the security risks and threats seen by other agents in the
network, thereby influencing their security investments.
It is shown that positive externalities produced by security
measures on neighbors often lead to free riding [19], [20],
[26]; when some agents invest in security measures, positive
externalities they generate curtail the risk experienced by other
agents, thus reducing their incentive to protect themselves and
invest in security. Consequently, they cause under-investments
in security by strategic agents and social inefficiency [39]. For
this reason, the presence of externalities in IDS considerably
complicates the analysis of the interactions among strategic
agents.
Let us illustrate these concepts with the help of the follow-
ing example.
 Spread of malware via emails: When a user’s device is
infected by malware, it can scan the user’s emails or the hard
disk drive of the infected machine and send the user’s personal
or other confidential information to criminals interested in
stealing, for instance, the user’s identity (ID) or trade secrets.
Moreover, the malware can browse the user’s address book
and either forward it to attackers or send out bogus emails,
i.e., email spoofing, with a link or an attachment to those on
the contact list. When a recipient clicks on the link or opens
the attachment, it too becomes infected.
In order to reduce the risks or threats from malware, users
can install an anti-malware utility on their devices. When a
user adopts an anti-malware tool, not only does it reduce its
own risk, but it also lessens the risk to those on its address
book for the reason stated above, in doing so protecting
its friends to some degree. Therefore, it produces positive
externalities for others [36], [37]. Interestingly, these positive
externalities diminish the benefits of installing anti-malware
utilities for others, thus introducing negative network effects
for them.
A. Summary and main contributions
For mathematical tractability, we employ a population
game [33] to model the interactions among agents. This model
is a generalization of the model used in our previous studies
that considered neutral dependence graphs [19], [20]; we as-
sume a continuous action space, where an action represents the
security investment chosen by an agent with an understanding
that the agent selects the best combination of security measures
subject to the budget constraint.
In order to measure the global network security and the
local security experienced by individual agents, which is then
utilized for choosing security investments, we adopt what we
call the average risk exposure (ARE) from neighbors. While
other global metrics, such as the probability of cascading
failures/infections, have been adopted by existing studies,
including our previous study [20], we argue that the ARE is
a more natural and meaningful metric for our purpose for the
following reasons.
Since the agents can base their decisions only on local
information or risks they can observe and assess, we need to
model the local security risks they experience. First, we will
show that the ARE captures the average security risks agents
of varying degrees perceive from a neighbor, which allow them
to approximate their total security risks from all neighbors.
Second, the agents are unlikely to have access to the value of
a commonly adopted global metric (e.g., cascade probability)
as they lack global information, including network topology
and the security decisions of other agents. This makes such
global metrics unsuitable as information on which the agents
can act. In contrast, the ARE also serves as a global security
metric because it is proportional to the total (expected) number
of attacks in the network. For this reason, it provides us with
a consistent metric for (a) measuring the global security and
(b) capturing the local security information on which agents
act, and enables us to compare the overall network security as
we vary the properties of dependence graph.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
S1. We show that there exists a unique (pure-strategy)
Nash equilibrium (NE) of a population game under a mild
technical condition. Then, we examine how the assortativity
of dependence graph changes the ARE at the unique NE
as agents with varying degrees experience different risks
from their neighbors due to degree correlations. In particular,
we prove that when the agents with larger degrees in the
dependence graph see higher risks than those with smaller
degrees, the overall network security deteriorates in that the
ARE experienced by agents increases and there are more
attacks in the network.
S2. Making use of this finding, we demonstrate that the
effects of network mixing on ARE depend on the cost ef-
fectiveness of security measures available to agents; if the
security measures are not effective, increasing assortativity of
dependence graph results in higher ARE. On the other hand,
if the security measures are effective at lowering the damages
and losses from attacks, increasing assortativity reduces the
ARE experienced by agents.
S3. Using numerical studies, we examine how the cost
effectiveness of security measures and the sensitivity of ARE
to the vulnerability of agents to attacks shapes the influence
of assortativity. Numerical results suggest that as security
measures improve and become more effective at fending off
attacks, the assortativity of dependence graph has greater
effects on network security. Similarly, when ARE is more
sensitive to agents’ vulnerability to attacks, assortativity has
stronger impact on equilibrium ARE.
As summarized in the following section, existing studies
demonstrated that the assortativity of a network can signif-
icantly affect its robustness and resilience, e.g., [29], [38],
[39]. Thus, understanding the effects of dependence graph
properties is important to (i) predicting the overall network-
or system-level security and (ii) devising sound policies.
While we admit that our analysis is carried out using
a simplified model, to the best our knowledge, our work
here and in [19], [20], [21] is the first (analytical) study
of how the network security is shaped by the properties
of dependence graph that governs the interdependence in
security among strategic agents. Unlike our previous studies
3that assumed neutral dependence graphs, however, the focus
of the current study is the impact of degree correlations in the
dependence graph on network security. As summarized earlier,
incorporating the strategic nature of agents leads to somewhat
unexpected and interesting observation that the net influence
of degree correlations is also determined by the effectiveness
of available security measures.
We believe that the qualitative nature of our findings pro-
vides valuable insights into the behavior of strategic agents
in IDS settings, which we hope would be helpful in (i)
understanding the pitfalls in studying the security of complex
systems and (ii) designing better security policies and regula-
tions. Finally, we emphasize that our goal is to understand the
effects of heterogeneous security risks experienced by agents
based on their degrees (due to degree correlations) on network
security, as opposed to accurate modeling of assortativity
observed in real networks. Thus, it is not our intent to develop
a more accurate model of dependence graphs with degree
correlations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We
provide a short survey of closely related literature in Section II.
Section III describes the population game model we adopt for
our analysis, and Section IV introduces the security metric
we employ for comparing network security and explains
how we model the effects of degree correlations. Section V
introduces some preliminary results we need for our main
findings reported in Section VI. Numerical results are provided
in Section VIII. We conclude in Section IX.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
There are existing studies on IDS, many of which employ a
game theoretic approach to model the strategic nature of agents
(e.g., [14], [16], [17]). We refer an interested reader to a survey
paper by Laszka et al. [27] and references therein for a succinct
discussion of these and other related studies. In addition, many
researchers investigated the existence of assortativity in many
different types of networks, e.g., [2], [29], [31], [38]. Here, we
only focus on studies that examined the effects of assortativity
in epidemics or security-related settings and summarize their
main findings.
In [28], [29], Newman studied network mixing in different
types of networks, including biological networks, engineered
networks, and social networks. He first showed that while so-
cial networks in general exhibit assortativity, both engineered
and biological networks tend to be disassortative. He then
investigated how assortativity affects the phase transition in
the emergence of a giant component in random graphs as the
average degree of nodes increases.
His findings revealed that stronger assortativity makes it
easier for a giant component to appear, but at the same
time, the size of the giant component tends to be smaller.
Furthermore, breaking up the giant component by removing
a subset of nodes with the highest degrees becomes more
difficult when the network is assortative; the numerical results
suggest that the number of nodes that must be removed from
the network to split up the giant component in an assortative
network can be an order of magnitude larger than that of a
disassortative network.
He argued that these findings have following important
implications. First, preventing an outbreak of a disease via vac-
cination of high-degree individuals can be problematic because
social networks exhibit assortativity and the cluster of high-
degree nodes could serve as a reservoir of disease. However,
for the same reason, an epidemic will likely be limited to
a smaller portion of population if an outbreak does occur.
On the other hand, improving the resilience of engineered
networks, such as the Internet, which show disassortativity
becomes more challenging as disassortative networks are more
susceptible to coordinated attacks that target high-degree nodes
in the networks.
In [5], [6], Bogun˜a´ et al. studied the (existence) of epidemic
threshold in scale-free networks, using the popular susceptible-
infected-susceptible model. The key finding of the study
was that the degree correlations do not significantly affect
the existence of epidemic threshold as long as the degree
correlations are limited to immediate neighbors. Instead, the
(lack of) the existence of threshold is shaped by the divergence
of the second moment of node degrees when the power law
exponent lies in the interval (2, 3].
Another related study by Zhou et al. [40] investigated the
influence of assortativity on the robustness of interdependent
networks with the help of independent failure model, using
both Erdo¨s-Re´nyi networks and scale-free networks. Their
main finding suggests that increasing assortativity leads to de-
teriorating robustness of interdependent network; as a network
becomes more assortative, the initial number of nodes that
need to be removed in order to break up the giant component
in the network drops. This indicates that it is easier to break
up the giant component in an interdependent network by
eliminating randomly chosen nodes.
In a more concrete cybersecurity application, Yen and Reiter
[38] studied how the assortativity of botnets influences the
performance of takedown strategies. They first demonstrated
that botnets exhibit high assortativity and attributed this in
part to the working of botnets. Secondly, they showed that
some of well studied takedown strategies, in particular uni-
form takedown and degree-based takedown strategies, are
far less effective as the botnets become more assortative.
This finding suggests that previous studies carried out with
neutral botnets may be inaccurate and incorrectly portray a
more optimistic picture. Finally, they also considered other
alternative takedown strategies that take into account clustering
coefficients and closeness centrality and showed that a similar
trend continues.
We note that these studies do not take into consideration
the strategic nature of individual agents that can make their
own security decisions, which is natural in many settings of
interest. Our study considers strategic agents that determine
their security investments in response to the security risks they
observe. In addition, rather than focusing on giant components
in networks and possible cascades of infection, we analyze the
(local) network security experienced by individual agents as
a result of their security decisions at equilibria.
We studied related problems in [19], [20], [21] under neutral
4dependence graphs. In [21], we investigated (i) how we could
improve the overall (network) security by internalizing the
externalities produced by the security measures adopted by
agents and (ii) how the sensitivity of network security to
agents’ security investments influences the penalties or taxes
that need to be imposed on the agents to internalize exter-
nalities. Moreover, we showed [19], [21] that as the security
of agents gets more interdependent in that their degrees in
the dependence graph become larger (with respect to the
usual stochastic order [35]), the security experienced by agents
whose degrees remain fixed improves in that the number of
attacks they suffer goes down. Thus, this finding tells us, to
some extent, how the degree distribution in the dependence
graph affects the network security.
In [20], we considered a simple model where agents can
choose from three possible actions: i) invest in security,
ii) purchase security insurance to transfer (some of) risks,
and iii) take no actions. Using this model, we carried out
numerical studies that examined how the degree distribution of
dependence graph affects the cascade probability. Our study
demonstrated that as the interdependence in security rises, so
does the probability of cascade. Moreover, we derived an upper
bound on the price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of the social cost
at the Nash equilibrium to that of the social optimum, which
is a linear function of the average node degree.
We point out that none of the above studies, including our
own studies, investigated the role of network mixing in IDS
settings with strategic agents and no analytical findings have
been reported. A key difference between our study in [19],
[21] and the current study is the following: our previous study
focused on how varying degree distributions influence the
network security in a neutral dependence graph. The current
study, on the other hand, considers a fixed degree distribution
and examines how differing security risks seen by agents based
on their own degrees (due to degree correlations), shape the
resulting network security. Some of our preliminary results
have been reported in [22]. It, however, employs a simpler,
hence more restrictive model to facilitate the analysis.
III. MODEL
We capture the interdependence in security among the
agents using an undirected graph, which we call the depen-
dence graph. A node or vertex in the graph corresponds to an
agent (e.g., an individual or organization), and an undirected
edge between nodes n1 and n2 implies interdependence of
their security. We interpret an undirected edge as two directed
edges pointing in the opposite directions with an understanding
that a directed edge from node n1 to node n2 indicates that the
security of node n1 affects that of node n2 in the manner we
explain shortly. When there is an edge between two nodes, we
say that they are immediate or one-hop neighbors or, simply,
neighbors when it is clear.
We model the interaction among agents as a noncooperative
game, in which players are the agents.1 This is reasonable
because, in many cases, it may be difficult for agents to coop-
erate with each other and take coordinated countermeasures
1We will use the words agents, nodes and players interchangeably hereafter.
to attacks. In addition, even if they could coordinate their
actions, they would be unlikely to do so when there are no
clear incentives for coordination.
We are interested in scenarios where the number of agents
is large. Unfortunately, modeling detailed microscale interac-
tions among many agents in a large network and analyzing
ensuing games is difficult; the number of possible strategy
profiles typically increases exponentially with the number of
players and finding the NEs of noncooperative games is often
challenging even with a moderate number of players.
The notation we adopt throughout the paper is listed in
Table I.
C(x, d, a, s) Cost of an agent with degree d playing action a at
social state x
D Set of agent degrees or populations
(D = {1, 2, . . . , Dmax})
Dmax Maximum degree among agents or the number of
populations, i.e., Dmax = |D|
I (Pure) action space (I = [Imin, Imax])
Iopt(r) Optimal security investment of an agent facing r
expected attacks
L Average loss from a single infection
PI Set of probability distributions over I
X Cartesian product PDmaxI
davg or davg(s) Average or mean degree of agents
(davg(s) =
∑
d∈D d · fd(s))
eavg(x, s) Average risk exposure at social state x
ed(x, s) Risk exposure of pop. d at social state x
fd or fd(s) Fraction of agents with degree d
(fd(s) = sd/
∑
d′∈D sd′ )
g Mixing vector (g = (gd; d ∈ D))
p(a) Infection prob. of an agent investing a in security
p?(r) Infection prob. of an agent facing r expected attacks
and investing Iopt(r) in security
(p?(r) = p(Iopt(r)))
pd,avg(x) Average infection prob. of population d at social
state x
s Pop. size vector (s = (sd; d ∈ D))
sd Size of pop. d ∈ D
wd or wd(s) Weighted fraction of agents with degree d(
wd(s) =
d·sd∑
d′∈D d′·sd′
=
d·fd(s)
davg(s)
)
xd Pop. state of pop. d
x Social state (x = (xd; d ∈ D))
βIA Prob. of indirect attack on a neighbor by an infected
agent
τA Prob. that an agent experiences a direct attack
TABLE I
NOTATION (pop. = population, prob. = probability).
A. Population game model
For analytical tractability, we adopt a population game with
a continuous action space to model the interaction among the
agents [33]. As stated earlier, the (local) network security
is captured using ARE from neighbors. As we explain in
Section IV-A, the ARE is proportional to the total (expected)
number of attacks that propagate from the victims of success-
ful attacks to their neighbors in the network and can be viewed
as a measure of global network security.
We assume that the maximum degree among all agents
in the dependence graph is Dmax < ∞. For each d ∈
{1, 2, . . . , Dmax} =: D, population d consists of all agents
with common degree d. Let sd denote the size or mass of
5population d, and the population size vector s :=
(
sd; d ∈ D
)
tells us the sizes of populations with varying degrees.2
We find it convenient to define f(s) := (fd(s); d ∈ D),
where fd(s) = sd/
∑
d′∈D sd′ is the fraction of agents with
degree d in the dependence graph. Given a population size
vector s, we denote the average degree of agents by davg(s) :=∑
d∈D d·fd(s). When there is no confusion, we simply denote
f(s) and davg(s) by f and davg, respectively.
• Population state and social state – All agents have
the same action space I = [Imin, Imax] ⊂ IR+ := [0,∞),
where Imin < Imax < ∞. A (pure) action taken by an
agent represents the security investment made by the agent.
We denote the set of probability distributions over I by PI .
The population state of population d is given by xd ∈ PI .
In other words, given any (Borel) subset S ⊆ I, xd(S) tells
us the fraction of population d whose security investment lies
in S . The social state, denoted by x = (xd; d ∈ D) ∈ X :=
PDmaxI , specifies the actions chosen by all agents.
• Two types of attacks – In order to understand how the
degree correlations of dependence graph affect the security
investments of the agents and overall network security, we
model two different types of attacks agents suffer from –
direct and indirect attacks. While the first type of attacks is
independent of the dependence graph, the latter depends on it,
allowing us to capture the externalities produced by agents’
security choices.
a) Direct attacks: We assume that malicious attackers
launch attacks on the agents, which we call direct attacks.
While our model can be easily modified to handle a scenario
in which an agent can suffer more than one direct attack from
different attackers by modifying the cost function, here we
assume that an agent experiences at most one direct attack and
the probability of bearing a direct attack is τA, independently
of other agents.
When an agent experiences a direct attack, its cost depends
on its security investment; when an agent adopts action a ∈ I,
it is infected with probability p(a) ∈ [0, 1]. Also, each time an
agent is infected, it incurs on the average a cost of L. Hence,
the expected cost or loss of an agent from a single attack is
L(a) := L · p(a) when investing a in security.
It is shown [3] that, under some technical assumptions,
the security breach probability or probability of loss is a
log-convex (hence, strictly convex) decreasing function of the
investments. Based on this finding, we introduce the following
assumption on the infection probability p(a), a ∈ I.
Assumption 1: The infection probability p : I → [0, 1]
is continuous, decreasing and strictly convex. Moreover, it is
continuously differentiable on int(I) = (Imin, Imax).
b) Indirect attacks: Besides the direct attacks by the
attackers, an agent may also experience indirect attacks from
its neighbors that have sustained successful attacks and are
infected. We assume that an infected agent will unwittingly
participate in indirect attacks on its neighbors, each of which
is attacked with probability βIA ∈ (0, 1] independently of each
2Throughout the paper, all vectors are assumed to be column vectors.
other. When an agent investing a in security suffers an indirect
attack, it is infected with the same infection probability p(a).
We call βIA indirect attack probability (IAP). It affects
the local spreading behavior. Unfortunately, the dynamics of
infection propagation depend on the details of underlying
dependence graph, which are difficult to obtain or model
faithfully. In order to skirt this difficulty, instead of attempting
to model the detailed dynamics of infection transmissions
between agents, we abstract out the security risks seen by
the agents using the expected number of attacks an agent sees
from its neighbors. However, to capture the effects of network
mixing, we allow agents of varying degrees to experience
different risks from their neighbors as explained below and
in Section IV.
• Cost function – The cost function of the game is
determined by a function C : X ×D×I × IRDmax+ → IR. The
interpretation is that, when the population size vector is s and
the social state is x, the cost of an agent with degree d (hence,
from population d) playing action a ∈ I (thus, investing a in
security) is equal to C(x, d, a, s). As we will show below, in
addition to the cost of security investments, our cost function
also reflects the (expected) losses from attacks.
Given a social state x ∈ X , let ed(x, s) denote the average
number of indirect attacks an agent with degree d ∈ D sees
from a single neighbor. Hence, the average number of indirect
attacks experienced by agents of degree d would be d·ed(x, s).
One natural metric for the security risk seen by agents is the
number of attacks they expect to see. Hence, ed(x, s) captures
the security risk per neighbor observed by agents of degree
d. We call ed(x, s) the risk exposure (RE) for population d at
social state x. Since we are interested in understanding how
network mixing affects the agents’ security investments, it is
necessary to allow the RE to vary from one population to
another, i.e., ed(x, s) and ed′(x, s) can differ if d 6= d′.
Before we proceed, let us comment on the key difference
between the current model and that of our earlier work [21],
which only considers neutral dependence graphs with no
degree correlations. When the underlying dependence graph is
neutral, the degree distribution of neighbors does not depend
on the degree of the agent under consideration and the risk
exposure is identical for populations, i.e., ed(x, s) = ed′(x, s)
for all d, d′ ∈ D. As a result, both the model and the analysis
become much simpler.
We assume that the costs of an agent due to multiple
infections are additive. Hence, the expected cost of an agent
with degree d from indirect attacks is proportional to its
degree and RE ed(x, s). The additivity of costs is reasonable
in many scenarios, including the earlier example of malware
propagation; each time a user is infected by different malware
(e.g., ransomware) or its ID is stolen, the user will need to
spend time and incur expenses to deal with the problem.
Similarly, every time a corporate network is breached, besides
any financial losses or legal expenses, the network operator
will need to assess the damages and take corrective measures.
Based on this assumption, we adopt the following cost
function for our population game: for a given social state
x ∈ X , the cost of an agent with degree d investing a in
6security is equal to
C(x, d, a, s) = (τA + d · ed(x, s))L(a) + a. (1)
Note that τA + d · ed(x, s) is the total number of both direct
and indirect attacks an agent of degree d expects. Hence, the
first term on the right-hand side of (1) is the total expected
loss due to infections.
From now on, we take the viewpoint that the agents use
their expected number of attacks given by τA + d · ed(x, s)
as their perceived security risks at social state x. Based on
these observed risks, they decide their security investments to
minimize their cost given in (1).
• Nash equilibria – We focus on the NEs of population
games as an approximation to agents’ behavior in practice.
For every d ∈ D, define a mapping Ioptd : X → B(I), where
B(I) is the set of (Borel) subsets of I and
Ioptd (x) :=
{
a ∈ I ∣∣ C(x, d, a, s) = inf
a′∈I
C(x, d, a′, s)
}
.
Definition 1: A social state x? is an NE if x?d(Ioptd (x?)) = 1
for all d ∈ D.
Clearly, our model does not require that all agents from a
population adopt the same action in general. However, we are
often interested in cases in which the social state is degenerate,
i.e., all agents with the same degree adopt the same action. In
this case, we denote the action chosen by population d ∈ D
by ad, and refer to a := (ad; d ∈ D) ∈ IDmax as a pure
strategy profile.
With a little abuse of notation, we denote the RE of
population d ∈ D when a pure strategy profile a is employed
by ed(a, s).
Definition 2: A pure strategy profile a? ∈ IDmax is said to
be a pure-strategy NE if, for all d ∈ D,
a?d ∈ arg min
a∈I
(
(τA + d · ed(a?, s))L(a) + a
)
.
In other words, every agent in a population adopts the same
best response.
IV. AVERAGE RISK EXPOSURE AND THE EFFECTS OF
NETWORK MIXING
In this section, we first define the security metric we adopt
to measure the (global) network security, namely ARE, and
describe how we estimate it. Then, we lay out how we model
the the influence of degree correlations on the average security
risks experienced by agents of varying degrees (measured by
the expected number of attacks) via the REs ed(x, s), d ∈ D.
A. Average risk exposure
As mentioned in Section I, we use a metric we call ARE
to measure and compare the network security as we study
the impact of degree correlations. The ARE is defined to be
the (expected) total number of indirect attacks experienced
by all agents divided by the number of directed edges in the
dependence graph. Since ed(x, s) is the number of indirect
attacks an agent of degree d expects from a single neighbor at
social state x, its expected total number of indirect attacks is
d · ed(x, s). Therefore, the expected total number of indirect
attacks in the network is equal to
∑
d∈D (sd × d · ed(x, s)),
and the ARE is given by
eavg(x, s) =
∑
d∈D sd · d · ed(x, s)∑
d∈D sd · d
(2)
=
∑
d∈D
wd(s) · ed(x, s), (3)
where wd(s) := d · fd(s)/davg(s), d ∈ D.
Since it is by definition proportional to the expected total
number of indirect attacks in the network (for fixed degrees in
the network), the ARE can be considered a global metric for
network security which measures the aggregate security risks
to all agents in the form of attacks from neighbors. In the rest
of the paper, we take this viewpoint and study how network
mixing influences the network security measured by ARE.
While the definition of ARE is simple and intuitive, it does
not provide a means of computing ARE unless we already
know the REs ed(x, s) for all populations. Therefore, we
need a way to estimate it. Unfortunately, computing the ARE
exactly starting with its definition suffers from several major
technical difficulties; it depends on the detailed properties
of both the dependence graph and the dynamics of infection
propagation among agents. Modeling these accurately is diffi-
cult, if possible at all. More importantly, such detailed models
in general do not yield to mathematical analysis. For these
reasons, we seek to approximate ARE.
1) Approximation of ARE: In order to approximate the ARE
(and the REs), we base our model on the following observa-
tion: all indirect attacks begin with the first-hop indirect attacks
on the immediate neighbors by the victims of successful direct
attacks. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the total number
of indirect attacks in the network increases with the number
of the first-hop indirect attacks, each of which can initiate a
chain of indirect attacks thereafter.
Let
pd,avg(x) :=
∫
I
p(a) xd(da)
be the probability that a randomly selected agent of degree d
will suffer an infection from a single attack at social state x.
The expected number of agents with degree d which will fall
victims to direct attacks is τA ·sd ·pd,avg(x), and each infected
agent of degree d will attempt to transmit the infection to each
of its d neighbors with IAP βIA. Thus, the expected total
number of first-hop indirect attacks by the victims infected by
direct attacks is equal to τA · βIA
∑
d∈D (d · sd · pd,avg(x)).
Based on this argument, we approximate the ARE as a
strictly increasing function of τA ·βIA
∑
d∈D(d·sd ·pd,avg(x)).
But, we first normalize it by the total population size and work
with the expected number of first-hop indirect attacks per
agent, i.e., τA · βIA
∑
d∈D (d · sd · pd,avg(x)) /
∑
d∈D sd =
τA · βIA
∑
d∈D (d · fd(s) · pd,avg(x)), where the equality
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the ARE using
eavg(x, s) = Θ
(∑
d∈D
d fd(s) pd,avg(x)
)
(4)
for some strictly increasing function Θ : IR+ → IR+, which
we assume factors in both τA and βIA. A simple example of
function Θ is a linear function, i.e.,
eavg(x, s) = K
∑
d∈D
d fd(s) pd,avg(x) (5)
for some K > 0. The exact form of the function Θ will depend
on many factors, including the detailed dynamics of infection
propagation, direct attack probability τA, IAP βIA, and the
timeliness of deployed remedies (e.g., security patches) to stop
the spread of infection.
We impose the following assumption on the function Θ.
Assumption 2: The function Θ : IR+ → IR+ is continuous
and strictly increasing. Furthermore, it is continuously differ-
entiable over IR++ := (0,∞).
The first part of the assumption is natural as argued above.
While the latter part (i.e., continuous differentiability) is
introduced for convenience to facilitate our analysis, we feel
that it is reasonable; recall that the ARE is proportional to the
expected total number of indirect attacks in the network, and
multi-hop indirect attacks can be viewed as offsprings of one-
hop indirect attacks, starting with the victims of direct attacks.
For this reason, in practice, we expect the average security risk
measured by ARE to be a ‘smooth’ function of the expected
number of one-hop indirect attacks.
2) Alternate expression of ARE: Before we proceed, let us
provide an alternate expression of ARE, which helps us high-
light two distinct sources that influence the ARE and isolate
the one of interest to us. To this end, let us define a mapping
Φ : IRDmax+ × IR+ → IR+ with Φ(s, r) = Θ(davg(s) r). From
the definition of w(s), we have the following equality.∑
d∈D
d fd(s) pd,avg(x) = davg(s)
∑
d∈D
wd(s) pd,avg(x)
As explained in [20], [21],
∑
d∈D wd(s) pd,avg(x) is the
probability that an end node of a randomly selected edge
in the dependence graph is vulnerable to an attack,3 i.e., it
becomes infected when attacked, at social state x. Therefore,
it captures on the average how vulnerable neighboring agents
are to indirect attacks and, hence, serves as an indicator of how
easily an infection might transmit from one agent to another.
Using the definition of the mapping Φ, the ARE can be
rewritten as
eavg(x, s) = Θ
(
davg(s)
∑
d∈D
wd(s) pd,avg(x)
)
(6)
= Φ
(
s,
∑
d∈D
wd(s) pd,avg(x)
)
.
3This sampling technique is called sampling by random edge selection [27].
From (6), it is obvious that the ARE depends on two measures
that capture the ease with which an infection can spread
through the network: (a) the average degree of agents, davg(s),
indicates on the average how many other agents an infected
agent could potentially infect, and (b)
∑
d∈D wd(s) pd,avg(x)
tells us how vulnerable neighboring agents are in general.
The first argument of Φ depends only on the dependence
graph and is beyond the control of agents. Moreover, in
our study, we assume that the population sizes s, hence the
average degree davg(s), are fixed and study the influence of
degree correlations. On the other hand, the second argument
is a function of the social state x chosen by agents. Thus,
it incorporates the effects of degree correlations that induce
heterogeneous REs seen by agents of varying degrees and, as
a result, alter the equilibrium ARE (and REs) by affecting their
security investments.
B. The effects of network mixing
The expression in (2) tells us how the REs shape the ARE.
Another way of putting this is that, once the agents choose
the social state x and the REs are fixed for all populations,
we can compute the ARE and then infer the relations between
the ARE eavg(x, s) and individual REs ed(x, s), d ∈ D. These
relations reveal how the underlying degree correlations bias
the REs at the social state x (relative to a neutral dependence
graph under which ed(x, s) = eavg(x, s) for all d ∈ D and all
x ∈ X ). Therefore, they summarize the net effects of degree
correlations on security risks experienced by agents based on
their degrees.
In this paper, we assume that these relations are approxi-
mately linear. In other words, for every d ∈ D, there exists
some gd > 0 such that ed(x, s) = gd ·eavg(x, s) for all x ∈ X .
The case with gd = 1 for all d ∈ D corresponds to the neutral
dependence graph because ed(x, s) = eavg(x, s) for all d ∈ D,
and agents see similar risks from their neighbors regardless of
their own degrees.
Obviously, this is a simplifying assumption and might not
hold in practice. However, we feel that it is a reasonable
first-order approximation for local analysis around neutral
dependence graphs at the NEs, which is the main focus of
this paper (Theorem 2 in Section VI), and allows us to
tackle otherwise a very difficult problem of understanding
how different REs experienced by agents with varying degrees
shape their security investments and resulting network security.
We refer to g := (gd; d ∈ D) as a mixing vector. It
models a bias or skewness in the average risk posed by
neighbors to agents with varying degrees, which is caused
by degree correlations. However, it does not correspond to
any existing measure of assortativity, such as assortativity
coefficient (which is Pearson correlation coefficient). In this
sense, we are primarily concerned with capturing the net
effects of degree correlations seen by agents with different
degrees, without having to worry about accurate modeling or
measuring of assortativity itself.
For example, suppose that (i) agents with smaller degrees do
not have a strong incentive to invest in security and fall victim
to attacks more often than those with larger degrees and (ii)
8the dependence graph exhibits disassortativity (hence, agents
with high degrees are more likely to be connected to agents of
small degrees). Then, gd would be greater than one for large d
because they would see larger risks from their neighbors with
small degrees. Similarly, gd would be less than one for small
d because agents with small degrees would be more likely to
have neighbors with large degrees, which would pose lower
risks.
V. PRELIMINARIES
From (1) and (4), for a fixed mixing vector g, the cost
function is identical for two population size vectors s1 and
s2 with the same node degree distribution, i.e., f(s1) = f(s2).
This scale invariance property of the cost function implies that
the set of NEs is identical for both population size vectors. As
a result, it suffices to study the NEs for population size vectors
whose sum is equal to one, i.e.,
∑
d∈D sd = 1. For this reason,
without loss of generality we impose the following assumption
in the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 3: The population size vectors are normalized
so that the total population size is equal to one.
Keep in mind that, under Assumption 3, the node degree
distribution f(s) is equal to the population size vector s, i.e.,
f(s) = s.
Let us discuss a few observations that will help us prove
the main results.
• Infection probability at optimal investments: For each
r ∈ IR+, let Iopt(r) be the set of optimal investments for
an agent when its security risk (measured by the number of
attacks it expects) is r. In other words,
Iopt(r) = arg min
a∈I
(
r L(a) + a
)
.
Under Assumption 1, one can show that the optimal investment
is unique, i.e., Iopt(r) is a singleton for all r ∈ IR+. Hence, we
can view Iopt : IR+ → I as a mapping that tells us the optimal
investment that will be chosen by an agent as a function of
the number of attacks it expects. This in turn implies that, at
an NE x?, the population state x?d is concentrated on a single
point, i.e., x?d({Iopt(τA + d · ed(x?, s))}) = 1 for all d ∈ D.
Define
rmin = sup{r ∈ IR+ | Iopt(r) = Imin}
and
rmax = inf{r ∈ IR+ | Iopt(r) = Imax}.
From their definitions, rmin (resp. rmax) is the largest number
of attacks (resp. the smallest number of attacks) experienced
by an agent, for which the optimal investment is Imin (resp.
Imax). Then, Iopt(r) is nondecreasing in r. Moreover, it is
strictly increasing over [rmin, rmax].
Let the mapping p? : IR+ → [0, 1] be the composition of
p : I → [0, 1] and Iopt : IR+ → I, i.e., p?(r) = p (Iopt(r)).
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of
(i) the assumption that p is decreasing and (ii) the earlier
observation that Iopt is nondecreasing (and strictly increasing
over [rmin, rmax]).
Corollary 1: The mapping p? is nonincreasing. Furthermore,
it is strictly decreasing over [rmin, rmax].
Example: We provide an example to illustrate this. Suppose
that C˜ : IR+ × I → IR, where C˜(r, a) = r L(a) + a =
r L p(a) + a and p(a) = exp(−ξ a) for some ξ > 0. Clearly,
C˜ is a mapping that tells us the cost of an agent seeing r
attacks as a function of its security investment. Fix r ∈ IR+
and differentiate C˜(r, a) with respect to a.
∂C˜(r, a)
∂a
= r L p′(a) + 1
= −r L ξ exp(−ξ a) + 1
This yields Iopt(r) = min(Imax,max(Imin, log(r L ξ)/ξ)),
r ∈ IR+. It is obvious that Iopt is nondecreasing in r. Also,
rmin = exp(Imin ξ)/(L ξ) and rmax = exp(Imax ξ)/(L ξ).
Substituting these expressions in the given functions, we
obtain
p?(r) = p(Iopt(r)) =
(
R˜(r) L ξ
)−1
,
where R˜(r) = min(rmax,max(rmin, r)). Thus, the infection
probability at the optimal investment is decreasing in the
expected number of attacks r.
• The existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium: Let
∆n, n ∈ IN, denote the probability simplex in IRn. The
following lemma establishes the existence of pure-strategy
NEs of population games. In order to improve readability, we
defer the proofs of all main results to Section VII, which can
be skipped without causing confusion elsewhere.
Lemma 1: For every pair of population size vector s ∈
∆Dmax and mixing vector g ∈ IRDmax+ , there exists a pure-
strategy NE of the corresponding population game.
Proof: A proof is provided in Section VII-A.
From an earlier discussion, under Assumption 1, any NE
of a population game, say x?, is a pure-strategy NE. In
other words, there exists a pure strategy profile a? such that
x?({a?}) = 1. This is because, once the REs ed(x?, s), d ∈ D,
are fixed at the NE, every population has a unique optimal
investment that minimizes its cost given by (1).
VI. MAIN ANALYTICAL RESULTS
In the previous section, we established the existence of a
pure-strategy NE. But, when there are more than one NE, it
is not always obvious which NE is more likely to emerge in
practice, and one often has to turn to equilibrium selection
theory in order to identify more likely NEs. If this were the
case for our problem, it would be difficult to compare how
the overall security would be affected by the varying degree
correlations of the underlying dependence graph.
Our first result addresses this issue and establishes the
uniqueness of pure-strategy NE of a population game. Thus,
it allows us to compare the network security at NEs as system
parameters change.
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mixing vector g ∈ IRDmax+ , there exists a unique pure-strategy
NE of the population game.
Proof: A proof is provided in Section VII-B.
We denote the unique pure-strategy NE in Theorem 1 by
a?(s,g) hereinafter. Our main result on the influence of degree
correlations on network security is stated in the following
theorem: it tells us how the effects of network mixing captured
via the mixing vector g might change the security investments
of strategic agents and ensuing network security in the local
neighborhood of a neutral dependence graph.
To make progress, we assume that p? satisfies the following
assumption.
Assumption 4: The product r · p˙?(r) is strictly increasing
over [rmin, rmax].
For example, this assumption is true when the optimal infec-
tion probability p? can be well approximated over the interval
[rmin, rmax] by (a) p?(r) = ν1/(r + ν2)χ1 with ν1, χ1 > 0
and 0 ≤ ν2 ≤ rmin/χ1 or (b) p?(r) = ν3/ (log(r + ν4))χ2
with ν3, χ2 > 0 and ν4 ≥ 1 satisfying
rmin
log(rmin + ν4)
≥ ν4
χ2 + 1
.
Obviously, it holds when the optimal infection probability can
be approximated by a sum of these functions or other functions
that satisfy the assumption.
Let 1 be the Dmax × 1 vector consisting of ones, i.e., 1 =
(1, . . . , 1)T .
Theorem 2: Fix a population size vector s ∈ ∆Dmax and
assume that a?(s,1) ∈ int(IDmax). Then, there exists an open,
convex set G ⊂ IRDmax+ containing 1 such that if gi ∈ G, i =
1, 2, are two mixing vectors satisfying
d∑
d′=1
wd′(s) g
1
d′ ≤
d∑
d′=1
wd′(s) g
2
d′ for all d ∈ D, (7)
then eavg(a?(s,g2), s) ≤ eavg(a?(s,g1), s). Furthermore,
if the inequality in (7) is strict for some d ∈ D, then
eavg(a
?(s,g2), s) < eavg(a
?(s,g1), s).
Proof: Please see Section VII-C for a proof.
A key idea in the proof of the theorem is the following: we
construct a finite sequence of mixing vectors, starting with g2
and ending with g1. In each step, the RE experienced by agents
in some population d1 climbs while that of agents in another
population d2 < d1 is reduced proportionately. We show that
this ‘transfer’ of some of RE from agents with a smaller degree
(d2) to other agents with a larger degree (d1) results in an
increase in ARE at the unique pure-strategy NE. Moreover,
we provide a procedure for constructing such a sequence of
mixing vectors.
From (3) and the definition of mixing vector, an admissible
mixing vector g must satisfy the following equality.
eavg(x, s) =
∑
d∈D
(
wd(s) · ed(x, s)
)
=
∑
d∈D
(
wd(s) · gd · eavg(x, s)
)
or, equivalently,
∑
d∈D wd(s)·gd = 1. This implies that we can
view v(s,g) = (vd(s,g); d ∈ D) with vd(s,g) = wd(s)·gd as
a distribution over D. When the inequality in (7) is strict for
some d ∈ D (i.e., g1 6= g2), it means that the distribution
v1(s,g) first-order stochastically dominates v2(s, g) [35].4
Hence, Theorem 2 states that the ARE increases as the
distribution v(s,g) becomes (stochastically) larger.
The following lemma provides a sufficient condition for (7).
Lemma 2: Suppose that two mixing vectors g1 and g2
satisfy
g1d
g2d
≤ g
1
d+1
g2d+1
for all d = 1, 2, . . . , Dmax − 1. (8)
Then, the condition (7) in Theorem 2 holds.
Proof: Please see Section VII-D for a proof.
An interpretation of (8) is that agents experience compara-
tively greater REs with increasing degrees under mixing vector
g1 compared to under mixing vector g2. Thus, Theorem 2 tells
us that, when agents face higher risks from their neighbors
with increasing degrees, the resulting ARE at the pure-strategy
NE climbs.
A. Case study - role of cost effectiveness of security measures
As mentioned earlier, Theorem 2 sheds some light on how
the changing degree correlations of the underlying dependence
graph might influence the ARE as it deviates from a neutral
graph and becomes either assortative or disassortative. Inter-
estingly, it turns out that the answer also depends on the (cost)
effectiveness of available security measures, i.e., how quickly
the infection probability p drops with security investment. To
illustrate this, we consider following example cases.
Suppose that p?(r) = ν r−χ over [rmin, rmax] for some
ν, χ > 0.
Case 1: Effective security measures – χ > 1: This
describes cases where the security measures are cost effec-
tive in that the probability of infection falls quickly with
increasing security investments. In this case, it is easy to
see that the expected number of successful attacks or in-
fections an agent of degree d suffers at an NE, namely(
τA+d ed(a
?(s,g), s)
)
p?
(
τA+d ed(a
?(s,g), s)
)
, is decreas-
ing in d when the mixing vector g is sufficiently close to 1.
Thus, at a pure-strategy NE, agents with higher degrees suffer
fewer number of infections than agents with smaller degrees.
For this reason, if the network is assortative, agents with
higher degrees would see lower risks from their neighbors
that tend to have larger degrees as well. Accordingly, gd
would decrease with d, and Theorem 2 suggests that the
ARE would decrease (compared to the case with a neutral
dependence graph). A similar argument tells us that if the
network becomes disassortative and agents with higher degrees
tend to be neighbors with those of smaller degrees, the ARE
would rise as a result.
4This is equivalent to saying that a random variable with distribution
v1(s,g) is larger than a random variable with distribution v2(s,g) with
respect to the usual stochastic order [35].
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Case 2: Ineffective security measures – χ < 1: In contrast
to the first case, in the second case the probability of infec-
tion does not diminish rapidly with the security investments.
Consequently, agents with higher degrees would suffer more
infections in spite of higher security investments because they
also experience more attacks. Thus, Theorem 2 indicates that
when the network is assortative (resp. disassortative), the ARE
would be higher (resp. lower) compared to the case of a neutral
dependence graph.
This finding highlights another layer of difficulty in under-
standing the effects of network mixing on overall network
security when the agents are strategic; the overall effects
of degree correlations depend also on how effective security
measures are at fending off attacks. Our finding suggests that
when the security measures are more cost effective and the
probability of infection drops quickly with increasing security
investments (case 1), the higher assortativity of dependence
graph tends to reduce the ARE at the equilibrium. On the
other hand, when the security measures are not cost effective
(case 2), it has the opposite effect.
Finally, we point out that our finding is proved only in
the local neighborhood around the neutral dependence graph.
However, as our numerical study in the subsequent section
shows, we suspect that it holds much more generally even
outside the local neighborhood.
VII. PROOFS OF MAIN RESULTS
This section contains the proofs of main results in Sec-
tions V and VI. A reader who is not interested in the proofs
can proceed to Section VIII for numerical studies.
A. A proof of Lemma 1
Let H : IDmax → IDmax , where Hd(a) = Iopt(τA +
d e(a, s)), d ∈ D. Then, from Assumption 1 and the definition
of Iopt, the mapping H is continuous. Therefore, since IDmax
is a compact, convex subset of IRDmax , the Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem [15] tells us that there exists a fixed point of
H , say a′, such that H(a′) = a′. It is clear from the definition
of a pure-strategy NE in Definition 2 that a′ is a pure-strategy
NE.
B. A proof of Theorem 1
In order to prove the theorem, we will first prove that if
a1 and a2 are two pure-strategy NEs, then eavg(a1, s) =
eavg(a
2, s). We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that the
claim is false and there exist two pure-strategy NEs with dif-
ferent AREs. Without loss of generality, assume eavg(a1, s) <
eavg(a
2, s). This means that ed(a1, s) < ed(a2, s) for all
d ∈ D.
Together with Corollary 1, this means p(a1d) ≥ p(a2d) for
all d ∈ D and, as a result,
eavg(a
1, s) = Θ
(∑
d∈cD
d sd p(a
1
d)
)
≥ Θ
(∑
d∈cD
d sd p(a
2
d)
)
= eavg(a
2, s).
But, this contradicts the earlier assumption eavg(a1, s) <
eavg(a
2, s). The theorem now follows from the observation
that, for every population d ∈ D, given a fixed RE, there
exists a unique optimal investment that minimizes the cost.
This proves the uniqueness of pure-strategy NE.
C. A proof of Theorem 2
Since the population size vector s is fixed, for notational
convenience, we shall omit the dependence of eavg, Φ and w
on s throughout the proof.
First, note from (3) that pure-strategy NEs ai = a?(s,gi),
i = 1, 2, satisfy
eavg(a
i) = Φ
(∑
d∈D
wd p(a
i
d)
)
= Φ
(∑
d∈D
wd p
?
(
τA + d g
i
d eavg(a
i)
))
. (9)
Moreover, given a mixing vector g, by the uniqueness of pure-
strategy NE and Corollary 1, there exists a unique eavg that
satisfies (9), namely eavg(a?(s,g)).
Define ϑ : IRDmax+ × IR+ → IR, where
ϑ(g, e) = Φ
(∑
d∈D
wd p
?(τA + d gd e)
)
− e. (10)
From (9), we have
ϑ(gi, eavg(a
i)) = 0, i = 1, 2. (11)
Also, one can verify
∂ϑ(gi, eavg(a
i))
∂e
< 0. (12)
This is intuitive because as the ARE rises, agents see higher
risks and invest more in security, thus reducing their vulnera-
bility to attacks.
From (11) and (12) and the assumption in the theorem, the
implicit function theorem [32] tells us that there exist open
sets Oe ∈ IR+ and Og ⊂ IRDmax+ , which contains 1, and a
function e? : Og → Oe such that, for all g ∈ Og,
ϑ(g, e?(g)) = 0.
It is clear that e?(g) = eavg(a?(s,g)) for all g ∈ Og. In
addition, for all d ∈ D,
∂e?(g)
∂gd
= −
(
∂ϑ(g, e?(g))
∂e
)−1
∂ϑ(g, e?(g))
∂gd
. (13)
Hence, (13) tells us how the ARE will change locally as the
mixing vector is perturbed around 1, i.e., a neutral graph.
The theorem can be proved with the help of the following
lemma. Let ed denote the Dmax × 1 zero-one vector whose
only nonzero element is the dth entry.
Lemma 3: Let 1 ≤ d2 < d1 ≤ Dmax. Choose g3 ∈ Og
and δ > 0. Suppose g4 := g3 + δed1 − δwd1wd2 ed2 ∈ Og.
Then, for all sufficiently small δ, we have eavg(a?(s,g3)) <
eavg(a
?(s,g4)).
Proof: A proof of lemma is provided in Section VII-E.
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Theorem 2 now follows from the observation that, starting
with mixing vector g2, we can obtain the other mixing vector
g1 by performing a sequence of operations described in
Lemma 3. We first provide the procedure for general cases
and then illustrate it using an example.
Procedure for constructing g1 from g2
• Step 0: Let g˜ = g2.
• Step 1: Find d1 = max{d ∈ D | g1d > g˜d} and d2 =
min{d ∈ D | g˜d > g1d}.
• Step 2: Increase g˜d1 by min
(
g1d1 − g˜d1 ,
wd2
wd1
(g˜d2 −g1d2)
)
,
and reduce g˜d2 by min
(
g˜d2 − g1d2 ,
wd1
wd2
(g1d1 − g˜d1)
)
.
• Step 3: If g˜ 6= g1, repeat Steps 1 and 2 with new g˜.
The first-order stochastic dominance of v1 := (wd g1d; d ∈
D) over v2 := (wd g2d; d ∈ D) guarantees that the above
procedure will terminate after a finite number of iterations with
g˜ = g1. Moreover, Lemma 3 tells us that the ARE increases
after each iteration.
Example – Suppose w = (0.6 0.3 0.1)T , g1 =
(0.942 1.05 1.2)T , and g2 = (1.02 1.0 0.88)T . Then, one
can easily verify that condition (7) in Theorem 2 is satisfied.
◦ Step 0: g˜ = g2.
Iteration #1
◦ Step 1: d1 = 3 and d2 = 1.
◦ Step 2: Increase g˜3 by min
(
1.2 − 0.88, 0.60.1 × (1.02 −
0.942)
)
= 0.32, and decrease g˜1 by min
(
1.02− 0.942, 0.10.6 ×
(1.2 − 0.88)) = 0.053. This gives us new g˜ =
(0.967 1.0 1.2)T , which does not equal g1.
Iteration #2
◦ Step 1: d1 = 2 and d2 = 1.
◦ Step 2: Increase g˜2 by min
(
1.05 − 1.0, 0.60.3 × (0.967 −
0.942)
)
= 0.05, and reduce g˜1 by min
(
0.967− 0.942, 0.30.6 ×
(1.05−1.0)) = 0.025. This yields new g˜ = (0.942 1.05 1.2)T ,
which is equal to g1, and we terminate the procedure.
D. A proof of Lemma 2
We prove the lemma with help of the following Lemma 2,
whose proof is straightforward and is omitted here.
Lemma 4: Suppose that a = (a`; ` = 1, . . . ,K) and b =
(b`; ` = 1, . . . ,K) are two finite sequences of nonnegative real
numbers of length K > 1 and satisfy
b`+1
a`+1
≤ b`
a`
for all ` = 1, . . . ,K − 1. (14)
Then, ∑K
`=1 b`∑K
`=1 a`
≤
∑k
`=1 b`∑k
`=1 a`
for all k = 1, . . . ,K. (15)
Proceeding with the proof of Lemma 2, recall that the
condition (8) in Lemma 2 states
wd+1(s) g
2
d+1
wd+1(s) g1d+1
=
vd+1(s,g
2)
vd+1(s,g1)
≤ vd(s,g
2)
vd(s,g1)
=
wd(s) g
2
d
wd(s) g1d
for all d = 1, 2, . . . , Dmax − 1. (16)
Together with (16), Lemma 4 tells us, for all d =
1, 2, . . . , Dmax, we have∑Dmax
d′=1 vd′(s,g
2)∑Dmax
d′=1 vd′(s,g
1)
=
1
1
≤
∑d
d′=1 vd′(s,g
2)∑d
d′=1 vd′(s,g
1)
or, equivalently,
d∑
d′=1
vd′(s,g
1) ≤
d∑
d′=1
vd′(s,g
2).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
E. A proof of Lemma 3
In order to prove the lemma, we will use (13) to demonstrate
0 >
∂e?(g3)
∂gd1
>
wd1
wd2
∂e?(g3)
∂gd2
. (17)
First, note
∂ϑ(g3, e)
∂e
= Φ˙
(∑
d′∈D
wd′ p
?(τA + d
′ g3d′ e)
)
×
(∑
d′∈D
wd′ p˙
?(τA + d
′ g3d′ e) d
′ g3d′
)
− 1
< 0.
Hence, in order to prove (17), it suffices to show
0 >
∂ϑ(g3, e?(g3))
∂gd1
>
wd1
wd2
∂ϑ(g3, e?(g3))
∂gd2
.
From the definition of ϑ in (10),
∂ϑ(g3, e)
∂gd
= Φ˙
(∑
d′∈D
wd′ p
?(τA + d
′ g3d′ e)
)
× wd p˙?(τA + d g3d e) d e. (18)
Thus,
∂ϑ(g3, e?(g3))
∂gd1
− wd1
wd2
∂ϑ(g3, e?(g3))
∂gd2
= Φ˙
(∑
d′∈D
wd′ p
?(τA + d
′ g3d′ e
?(g3))
)
wd1 e
?(g3)
×
(
d1 p˙
?(τA + d1 g
3
d1 e
?(g3))
− d2 p˙?(τA + d2 g3d2 e?(g3))
)
> 0, (19)
where the inequality follows from our assumption d2 < d1,
g3d1 ≈ g3d2 for sufficiently small set Og including 1 and
Assumption 4.
Putting things together,
eavg(a
?(s,g4), s)− eavg(a?(s,g3), s)
= −
(
∂ϑ(g3, e?(g3))
∂e
)−1
×
(
∂ϑ(g3, e?(g3))
∂gd1
δ − wd1
wd2
∂ϑ(g3, e?(g3))
∂gd2
δ
)
+ o(δ). (20)
From the inequality in (19), for all sufficiently small δ > 0,
we have (20) > 0.
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VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide some numerical results (i) to
validate our main findings in the previous section and (ii)
to illustrate how the cost effectiveness of available security
measures and the function Θ in (4) affect the resulting ARE
at the pure-strategy NE. While our analytical findings in
the previous section offer some insights into the qualitative
behavior of the network security measured by ARE, it does
not provide quantitative answers. For this reason, we resort to
numerical studies to find out how the effectiveness of security
measures and the sensitivity of ARE to agents’ vulnerability
to attacks shape the impact of degree correlations on network
security.
For the numerical results, the maximum degree is set to
Dmax = 20, and the population size vector is assumed to
be a (truncated) power law with exponent 2, i.e. fd ∝ d−2.
It is shown that the degree distribution of many natural and
engineered networks can be approximated using a power law
with exponents in [1, 3] (e.g., [1], [23]). In addition, we choose
τA = 0.7, βIA = 1, Imin = 10−3, Imax = 103, and L = 10.
Here, we intentionally pick small Imin and large Imax so that
neither becomes an active constraint at an NE.
The mixing vectors we consider are of the form g(ρ)d ∝
dρ, d ∈ D, with ρ ∈ [-0.3, 0.3], subject to the constraint∑
d∈D wd ·g(ρ)d = 1. We pick this range of ρ to clearly demon-
strate the behavior of ARE as a function of ρ. Obviously, when
ρ = 0, we have g(0)d = 1 for all d ∈ D and the dependence
graph is neutral. Note that if ρ2 < ρ1, we have
g
(ρ2)
d+1
g
(ρ2)
d
=
(
d+ 1
d
)ρ2
<
(
d+ 1
d
)ρ1
=
g
(ρ1)
d+1
g
(ρ1)
d
for all d = 1, 2, . . . , Dmax − 1,
and the sufficient condition in (8) holds with strict inequality
for gi = g(ρi), i = 1, 2. Consequently, as ρ ascends, agents
experience greater REs with increasing degrees. Finally, the
interval [-0.3, 0.3] provides a sufficiently wide range of mixing
vectors to illustrate that the qualitative nature of our analytical
findings in the previous section holds outside a small local
neighborhood around the neutral graph.
We assume infection probability p(a) = γ/(a+ )γ , where
 = 0.1. We vary γ to alter the cost effectiveness of security
measures; the larger γ is, the more cost effective they are in
that the infection probability diminishes faster with security
investments. After a little algebra, we get
Iopt(r) = (r L γ)
1
γ+1 − , r ∈ [rmin, rmax], (21)
where
rmin =
(+ Imin)
γ+1
L γ
and rmax =
(+ Imax)
γ+1
L γ
.
Substituting (21) in p(a) yields
p?(r) =
γ
(r L γ)γ/(γ+1)
, r ∈ [rmin, rmax].
Therefore, p?(r) ∝ r−γ/(γ+1) over the interval [rmin, rmax],
and the infection probability at the optimal investment falls
more quickly with an increasing risk as γ climbs.
A. Effects of infection probability function
In our first numerical study, we examine how the effective-
ness of security measures, which is determined by γ, shapes
the effects of dependence graph assortativity on equilibrium
ARE. Since γγ+1 < 1, this corresponds to case 2 discussed
in the previous section. As a result, when ρ is negative
(resp. positive), the dependence graph is disassortative (resp.
assortative), and Theorem 2 suggests that the ARE shall rise
with increasing ρ. However, the theorem does not tell us the
quantitative behavior of the equilibrium ARE as either ρ or
the parameter of infection probability, namely γ, changes.
Thus, we turn to numerical studies to find an answer. For
our study, we employ a linear ARE function in (5) with
K · davg(s) = K · 2.254 = 1000.
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Fig. 1. Plots of ARE as a function of γ and ρ.
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Fig. 2. Plots of ARE as a function of ρ for γ = 1 and γ = 9.
Fig. 1 plots the ARE at the pure-strategy NE as both the
parameters ρ and γ are varied. There are two observations that
we point out. First, it confirms that, for fixed γ, the ARE rises
with increasing ρ as predicted by Theorem 2. This can be seen
more easily in Fig. 2, which displays the ARE as a function of
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ρ for two different values of γ (γ = 1 and 9). Second, it is clear
from Fig. 1 that as γ increases, hence γ/(γ + 1) climbs, the
ARE decreases quickly for all values of ρ we considered. This
hints at high sensitivity of the equilibrium ARE with respect
to the cost effectiveness of available security measures.
In addition to corroborating Theorem 2, Fig. 2 reveals two
additional interesting observations. First, it illustrates that the
influence of network mixing (equivalently, parameter ρ) on
ARE is more pronounced when the security measures are more
cost effective (i.e., γ is larger); when γ = 1 (resp. γ = 9), the
ARE rises from 14.9 to 16.23 (resp. from 2.508 to 2.935) as
ρ ascends from -0.3 to 0.3, which is roughly an 8.9 percent
increase (resp. a 17 percent increase). Therefore, they indicate
that, although the equilibrium AREs are smaller when the
security measures are more cost effective, they also become
more sensitive to the bias in REs caused by assortativity.
Second, the ARE is a convex function of ρ. This hints that
the impact of degree correlations on ARE gets stronger as the
dependence graph becomes more assortative. As a result, a
drop in ARE a disassortative dependence graph enjoys may not
be as large as an increase in ARE an assortative dependence
graph suffers. This in turn suggests that social networks, which
in general exhibit non-negligible positive degree correlations
[28], [29], may experience significant deterioration in security
relative to the findings obtained using neutral networks.
B. Effects of ARE function Θ
In our second study, we explore how the ARE function Θ
in (4) affects equilibrium ARE. In particular, we are interested
in how sensitive the ARE is to the assortativity of dependence
graph as we vary the shape of the function Θ.
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Fig. 3. Plots of the increase in ARE as a function of γ and η.
To this end, we adopt a family of functions of the form
Θ(z) = K ′(η)zη with K ′(η), η > 0, where the parameter
η is used to change the shape of the function Θ. In order
to compare the ARE as we vary η, we adjust the value of
parameter K ′(η) as a function of η so that the equilibrium
ARE is identical under the neutral dependence graph (i.e., ρ =
0) with γ = 5 (equivalently, γ/(γ + 1) = 0.83¯) for all values
of η we consider.
Fig. 3 plots the increase in ARE as we vary ρ from -0.3 to
0.3 for different values of (γ, η). More precisely, each point
in the figure represents the difference in ARE for ρ = 0.3 and
-0.3, divided by the value of ARE for ρ = −0.3.
It is clear from Fig. 3 that when γ/(γ + 1) is larger
(indicating that the security measures are more cost effective),
the ARE is more sensitive to assortativity because the relative
increase in ARE is greater for all considered values of η. This
confirms our finding in the previous subsection (illustrated by
Fig. 2).
More importantly, Fig. 3 reveals that assortativity has
greater impact on ARE when the ARE function Φ is more
sensitive to the vulnerability of neighbors summarized by∑
d∈D wd(s) p(ad). This observation is somewhat intuitive;
as ARE becomes more sensitive to the vulnerability of agents,
any changes in the security investments of agents will likely
amplify the effects other parameters, including the assortativity
of dependence graph.
IX. CONCLUSION
We studied the effects of degree correlations on network
security in IDS. Our findings reveal that the network security
degrades when agents with larger degrees experience higher
risks than those with smaller degrees. Moreover, somewhat
unexpectedly, the cost effectiveness of available security mea-
sures determines how network mixing influences network
security. Finally, our numerical studies suggest that as the
infection probability or the vulnerability of neighboring agents
becomes more sensitive to security investments, assortativity
exerts greater impact on network security. Our analytical study
carried out only a local analysis around neutral dependence
graphs. We are currently working to generalize our results
beyond the local neighborhood of neutral graphs.
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